Brussels Sprouts

Rising Domestic Pressure in Russia?

Over the last several weeks, strain within Russia's domestic political system has become increasingly apparent. The Kremlin has intensified digital controls, intermittently disrupting mobile internet access and placing growing pressure on foreign platforms, including the widely used Telegram messaging service. Authorities have also expanded efforts to restrict VPN use. While the government frames these measures as necessary to guard against Ukrainian drone attacks, public frustration appears to be mounting. Russians have attempted to hold protests and are voicing complaints on social media, with one video expressing grievances by an influencer and former reality TV star going viral.Discontent is also surfacing among segments of the elite. Politicians in the “systemic opposition,” along with some members of United Russia, have publicly questioned aspects of the tightening restrictions. Business leaders and economic officials concerned about mounting costs and disruptions have signaled unease. At the same time, structural pressures in the economy are becoming more pronounced. Despite benefiting from elevated energy revenues, Russia faces persistent inflation, fiscal strain, and an acute labor shortage. Putin’s central banker was just out declaring an unprecedented labor shortage driven by an exodus of 1.5 million people and about 1.3 million casualties in the war.
Individually, neither tightening information controls nor economic strain is likely to drive political change. But taken together, do these pressures point to something more consequential? And what do they mean for Russia's future?To answer these questions and more, Brussels Sprouts welcomes Alexander Gabuev and Joshua Yaffa to the show.Alexander Gabuev is the director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.Joshua Yaffa is a contributing writer at The New Yorker and the author of Between Two Fires: Truth, Ambition, and Compromise in Putin’s Russia, which won the Orwell Prize in 2021. 

Transatlantic Adaptation: A More European NATO?

Doubts about U.S. reliability and the future of NATO are top of mind for most in the transatlantic community. The concerns that spiked after President Donald Trump’s threats to seize Greenland have gained new urgency amid the standoff over Europe’s position on America’s war in Iran. The tensions in U.S. relations with Europe were on full display earlier this month during President Trump’s meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in Washington and afterward when Trump berated NATO allies online, calling the alliance a paper tiger.  
In the context of these criticisms and threats, European officials are reportedly working on fallback plans to ensure Europe can maintain deterrence against Russia, preserve command and control, and replace military assets if the United States departs the alliance. All of this raises fundamental questions about the future of the NATO alliance. How can Europe maintain credible deterrence with less U.S. involvement? And what is the latest thinking on how the alliance needs to adapt? 
To tackle these questions and more, Brussels Sprouts is excited to welcome back Ivo Daalder and Camille Grand to this week’s edition of the podcast. 
Ivo Daalder is a former U.S. ambassador to NATO and previously served as president and chief executive officer of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.
Camille Grand is secretary general of the Aerospace, Security, and Defence Industries Association of Europe and previously served as assistant secretary general for defense investment at NATO.

Orban Out: The Impact on European Politics, Ukraine, and Democracy

On April 12, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban conceded defeat in the country’s general elections, which ousted his party Fidesz and ended his rule of 16 years. The election was widely seen as a referendum on Orban’s self-described “illiberal democracy,” and his loss is a blow to the global nationalist movement promoted by U.S. President Donald Trump. Peter Magyar, a former ally of Orban and the founder of Tisza, the main opposition party, will take over as prime minister once the new parliament convenes.The defeat is striking not just because Orban held power for so long but because of just how rigged the Hungarian system was in his favor. Over 16 years, Orban’s party tilted the electoral system to its advantage, stacked the judicial system and independent agencies, and took control of most news media. Magyar and his party’s message focused on economic dissatisfaction and anticorruption, which resonated with voters and prompted record turnout. And Magyar’s Tisza party win has broader implications for Europe. In the short term, without Orban advocating for the Kremlin’s interests, blocking European assistance to Ukraine, and watering down sanctions against Russia, change in Hungary will likely yield positive results for Ukraine.To discuss all of this and more, Brussels Sprouts is excited to welcome Rosa Balfour and Dan Kelemen to this week’s edition. Rosa Balfour is the director of Carnegie Europe.R. Daniel Kelemen is the McCourt Chair at Georgetown University’s McCourt School of Public Policy. 

European Perspectives on the U.S.-Iran Conflict

On April 7, after more than five weeks of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran, U.S. President Donald Trump announced a 14-day ceasefire, provided Iran allows passage through the Strait of Hormuz. The following day, the leaders of seven European states—plus Canada, the European Commission, and the European Council—released a joint statement welcoming the ceasefire, encouraging a negotiated settlement, and announcing that their governments “will contribute to ensuring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.”The group included the United Kingdom (UK), France, Germany, and Spain, which has especially angered President Trump for its opposition to the war. Leaders from each of these countries and the European Union have also called for the ceasefire to include Lebanon, which the United States and Israel say was not part of the agreement. On a planned visit to the Gulf, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer emphasized the importance of opening the Strait of Hormuz, saying it is the “job” of leaders to do so. France’s top military commander said that the French government was considering “strictly defensive” military options to assist.That same day, Trump met with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in Washington as part of a long-scheduled visit. Trump reportedly used the meeting to vent his frustration with NATO allies over their refusal to back the U.S. war with Iran, signaling that he was considering reprisal. Trump, who has repeatedly threatened to pull the United States out of the alliance, berated NATO allies online following the meeting and alluded to his previous threats to annex Greenland—which precipitated the last major crisis in the transatlantic relationship before the war with Iran.  To make sense of these developments, Brussels Sprouts is happy to welcome back Constanze Stelzenmüller and Sophia Besch to this week’s edition of the podcast.  Sophia Besch is a senior fellow with the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
Constanze Stelzenmüller is the director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution. The episode was recorded on April 10, 2026. 

The War in Iran, a Benefit to Putin

While the world's attention has turned to the war with Iran, the war in Ukraine continues. Russia has seemingly kicked off its spring offensive, but a meaningful breakthrough remains unlikely. Moscow has increased the tempo of its operations, relying more heavily on mechanized and motorized assaults, an approach that is typical for this time of year. Yet last year's experience suggests limited prospects for success. Despite a similar surge last year, Russian forces achieved only marginal gains while incurring significant equipment losses, ultimately forcing Russian forces to relatively quickly return to smaller scale infiltration tactics.Meanwhile, the war in Iran will affect dynamics in Ukraine. The most pressing concern for Ukraine is its air and missile defense. Russia is expanding production of ballistic missiles and improving their effectiveness. Kyiv remains heavily dependent on U.S.-provided systems to intercept these threats, with no real viable alternative currently available. The United States is rapidly expending these resources in the Middle East. And the longer that conflict continues, the more it is likely to exacerbate Ukraine's vulnerability. Financially, Russia is also benefiting from the war with Iran. Higher oil prices and the easing of US sanctions are pumping higher revenue into Russia's coffers. Although Ukraine is taking bold steps to disrupt Russia's energy exports, a prolonged period of higher energy prices will, at a minimum, alleviate the economic strain that Moscow was feeling earlier this year.To discuss these dynamics and much more, Brussels Sprouts is very happy to welcome Elina Ribakova and Ambassador Bill Taylor to the show this week.
Ambassador Bill Taylor is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center and former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine.Elina Ribakova is vice president for foreign policy at the Kyiv School of Economics and a non-resident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

The United States, Iran, and the Risk to NATO

On March 14, in the wake of a global energy shock triggered by the United States military campaign against Iran, President Donald Trump called on allies to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz, where Iranian attacks on commercial shipping have disrupted oil flows. European leaders responded cautiously, and in many cases negatively, as they tried to balance concerns about the conflict with the need to preserve relations with Washington. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius was blunt, saying, “This is not our war.” United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Keir Starmer struck a more measured tone, pledging to work with allies to restore freedom of navigation, but emphasizing that the UK would “not be drawn into the wider war.” The following day, Trump raised the stakes, warning that NATO faces a “very bad” future if allies fail to act. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte expressed confidence that members would ultimately come together to secure the strait. But the incident has already exposed deep unease in Europe, both about the trajectory of the conflict and on the future of the transatlantic alliance.To discuss all of this and more, Brussels Sprouts is excited to welcome Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook and Jeremy Shapiro to this week’s show. Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook is executive vice president at the Bertelsmann FoundationJeremy Shapiro is the research director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, where he focuses on U.S. foreign policy and transatlantic relations 

Europe’s New Nuclear Deterrence Debate and France's Answer

On March 2, 2026, in a speech at France’s Île Longue base, French President Emmanuel Macron unveiled major changes to France’s nuclear deterrence doctrine. First, Macron announced an increase, the first since 1992, in France’s nuclear stockpile. France currently maintains 290 warheads and will increase that number to a now-undisclosed count. He also announced a new doctrine, what he called “forward deterrence.” This is a partnership with seven European countries—Germany, Poland, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, and Sweden—on strategic issues. That cooperation will include partner participation in nuclear exercises and the potential for France to temporarily deploy nuclear armed fighter jets to other European countries. While France will maintain the independence of its nuclear command and control and remain outside of NATO’s nuclear mission, this extension of the French nuclear umbrella represents a significant shift in French policy in response to the new realities of the European security environment, which includes a less reliable commitment from the United States. 
To help us understand these changes and to talk through broader implications of a declining U.S. presence in Europe for European strategic deterrence, Brussels Sprouts is excited to welcome Claudia Major and Bruno Tertrais to this week’s show. 
Claudia Major is the senior vice president of Transatlantic Security at the German Marshall Fund. 
Bruno Tertrais is the deputy director of the Foundation for Strategic Research and a non-resident fellow at the Institut Montaigne. 

Europe’s View on Operation Epic Fury

On February 28, the United States launched Operation Epic Fury, a major military campaign against Iran carried out alongside Israeli strikes. The opening wave targeted Iranian command and control nodes, missile forces, and military infrastructure across multiple cities and included a decapitation strike that killed the supreme leader. The conflict quickly spread beyond Iran itself. Tehran has retaliated with missile and drone strikes across the Gulf, hitting U.S. and allied targets in countries including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, and even striking the British military base in Cyprus.From Europe, the response has been sharply divided. Spain’s government has rejected what it called the “unilateral military action” by the United States and Israel and denied U.S. forces the use of Spanish bases for the operations. Sitting with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in the White House, President Donald Trump slammed Spain’s position and threatened to cut off trade with Madrid. And Spain hasn’t been Trump's only target—Trump has been highly critical of UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer. After Starmer said the UK did not support regime change from the sky and initially blocked the use of UK bases for strikes, Trump said of his counterpart, “this is not Winston Churchill we are dealing with,” and that the special relationship between the United States and the UK is “not what it was.” Across European capitals, officials are also bracing for the consequences: fears of a new refugee crisis, evacuations of citizens from countries across the Gulf, higher energy prices, cyber and terrorism threats, and concerns that a widening Middle East conflict could further strain already tight munitions supplies needed to support Ukraine. To discuss all this and much more, Brussels Sprouts welcomes Steven Erlanger and Julian Barnes-Dacey. Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times and is based in Berlin. Julien Barnes-Dacey is the director of the Middle East & North Africa program at the European Council on Foreign Relations. 

Reflecting on Four Years of War in Ukraine

This week marks the four-year anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Brussels Sprouts wanted to mark this somber milestone with a look at the conflict and the ongoing efforts to secure a durable end to the war. Even as the war in Ukraine shows no signs of an imminent end, the international community, and the allies in Europe in particular, have been working on the foundations of a credible security guarantee for Ukraine once the fighting ends. Part of this line of effort has been the proposed creation of a multinational force, which could be deployed to Ukraine once the hostilities cease to serve as a visible reassurance force. Perhaps more critically, the multinational force could help Ukraine regenerate its military forces and strengthen its own ability to deter further Russian aggression.Led by the United Kingdom and France, the multinational force has the potential to be a key pillar of Ukraine's future security, yet there are lingering questions about what the force aims to do and how it will function.The UK Minister for the Armed Forces Al Carns joins Brussels Sprouts to share insights on the multinational force, the state of the war at this four-year mark, and UK views on the changing dynamics in the European security landscape.Alistair Carns has served as the UK minister for the armed forces since September 2025 and as a member of Parliament since 2024. Before holding elected office, he served as an active-duty Royal Marine officer for 25 years. 

Can China Capitalize on Changing Transatlantic Currents?

This week’s episode of Brussels Sprouts picks up in the aftermath of the Munich Security Conference. The U.S. tone at Munich was notably more conciliatory than last year, as U.S. officials sought to calm anxieties. Secretary of State Marco Rubio received a standing ovation as he called European allies America’s oldest friends and cited the history of mutual defense from Korea to Afghanistan. But for many Europeans, the rhetoric did little to dispel deeper doubts about the trajectory of the transatlantic relationship. Meanwhile, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was also at Munich, stepping onto the main stage against the backdrop of transatlantic strain. Wang used his presence to position China as a responsible global actor and a stabilizing force in a fragmented world. Notably, the sharp European rhetoric toward Beijing that defined previous conferences was more muted. As tensions with Washington have mounted, several European leaders, including Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and United Kingdom Prime Minister Keir Starmer, have also traveled to Beijing.
Geopolitical currents in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific are rapidly changing, and there is no one better to talk about these developments than a former ambassador to both China and NATO: Ambassador Nick Burns. 
Nick Burns is a professor of diplomacy and international relations at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. Previously, he was a career foreign service officer and served as U.S. ambassador to China from 2021–2025 and as ambassador to NATO from 2001–2005.